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INTERVENTION
Covid-19 and the politics of temporality: constructing credibility 
in coronavirus discourse
Lee Jarvis
School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
The designation of, and response to, specific issues as security challenges is neither self-evident nor 
inevitable (e.g. Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998). Causes of harm must be constructed or 
performed as security issues to become thus; responses to (constructed) challenges must, in turn, 
be communicated or ‘sold’ to relevant audiences (Doty 1993; Holland 2013). In this piece, I attempt 
to show that this is as true of pandemics as it is of other (better-studied) threats from terrorism to 
nuclear proliferation. I do so by considering the UK government’s discursive response to the 
COVID-19 coronavirus, paying particular attention to the framing of governmental action within 
official problematisations thereof. The piece draws on a wider research project investigating UK 
political language across the first six months of this crisis.1
My argument, in brief, is that a repeated, and multi-faceted, claim to governmental credibility 
was vital to British political discourse on this pandemic. Consider the 7 April description of the 
Cabinet by the Foreign Secretary, then deputising for the hospitalised Prime Minster: ‘his team will 
not blink, and we will not flinch from the task at hand at this crucial moment. We will keep all of our 
focus and all of our resolve, with calm determination on delivering the government’s plan to defeat 
the coronavirus’ (Raab 2020a). Raab’s comments demonstrate two crucial generative claims within 
this construction of governmental credibility upon which I focus in this piece. These claims are, 
first, to the diligence of the executive, and, second, to its competence. Engaging with these claims, 
I suggest, offers two contributions to our understanding of this still unfolding crisis. First, it 
provides empirical understanding of the discursive framing of governmental activity during 
a moment of profound national and international significance. Second, it enables theoretical insight 
into the importance of constructions of temporality – constructions of time – within the politics of 
security more widely (see also Jarvis 2009; Stevens 2016). Let us consider the two claims in turn.
First, as indicated in Raab’s above comments, great emphasis was put on governmental diligence 
throughout this crisis. Common constructions of assiduousness included the detailing of repetitive 
executive activity – ‘From tomorrow daily press conferences will be hosted, [these] . . . form part of 
the government’s commitment to clarity and transparency’ (Number 10, 2020a) – and assurances of 
vigilance in emergency planning – ‘a new daily C-19 meeting . . . will be chaired by the Prime 
Minister’ (Number 10, 2020b). Such accounts dovetailed with more idiomatic claims to the 
ceaselessness of governmental work during this crisis: ‘Thousands of brilliant officials are already 
working round the clock but we must do more and faster’ (Johnson 2020a), and, ‘We are throwing 
everything at it, heart and soul, night and day’ (Johnson 2020b). And, importantly, with assurances 
the alacrity of government decision-making and action, evident, for instance, in the Prime 
Minister’s comments of 17 March 2020: ‘we are doing all we can and as quickly as we can to 
increase the capacity of the NHS’ (Johnson 2020a).
This constructed industriousness links to our second claim to credibility focused on govern-
mental competence throughout this crisis. Important here was the repeated referencing of 
CONTACT Lee Jarvis l.jarvis@uea.ac.uk
CRITICAL STUDIES ON SECURITY                       
2021, VOL. 9, NO. 1, 72–75 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904363
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License  
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
a readiness for exceptional, even unprecedented, action as appropriate to the circumstances, for 
instance: ‘we announced . . . steps yesterday . . . advising against all unnecessary contact . . . that are 
unprecedented since World War Two’ (Johnson 2020a); ‘we have taken unprecedented action to 
support our economy, to save jobs and secure livelihoods’ (Sharma 2020a); and, ‘We are . . . taking 
unprecedented action to increase NHS capacity’ (Sharma 2020b). This constructed courageousness 
was linked, importantly, to a claim to the timeliness of governmental decision-making: ‘As we’ve 
said consistently from the outset, it is vital we take the right decisions at the right time’ (Raab 
2020b), and, ‘we have been deliberate in our actions – taking the right steps at the right time’ (Raab 
2020c). Yet, although these constructions of exceptionalism and timeliness contribute to a shared 
performance of competence, the latter also nuances the former through referencing the nuances of 
political judgement and – where necessary – restraint. As the Prime Minister noted of the easing of 
restrictions instituted during the UK’s first national ‘lockdown’ beginning 23 March 2020, the UK 
could anticipate points in this crisis when: ‘we must move slowly, and at the right time’ (Johnson 
2020d).
Taken together, the above examples are illustrative of a relatively consistent performance of 
governmental credibility forged from a series of claims to diligence and competence. These claims, 
as we have seen, depict a government that was: (i) working daily, (ii) around the clock, and (iii) with 
alacrity, to (iv) take unprecedented, yet (v) circumstantially appropriate, action. As such, these 
claims are all fundamentally temporal, in that they concern the (i) regularity, (ii) duration, (iii) 
speed, (iv) novelty, and (v) timeliness of governmental activity during this crisis. This centrality of 
temporal claims to the government’s narration of its own response to COVID-19 is important, 
although not unexpected. As Paul Ricoeur (1990, 3) argues, ‘The world unfolded by every narrative 
work is always a temporal world [and] . . . narrative, in turn is meaningful to the extent that it 
portrays the features of temporal experience’. It is through narrative, put otherwise, that ‘scattered 
events’ (Ricoeur 1990, X) – pasts, presents and futures – become rendered meaningful through their 
(contingent) integration into ‘whole and complete stor[ies]’ (Ricoeur 1990, X).
If we look closer at the above examples, however, things become more complicated and more 
interesting because we encounter two distinct metaphors of temporality within this composite 
performance of credibility (see Torre 2007). On the one hand – in constructions of diligence 
through reference to the regularity, ceaselessness and speediness of activity – we encounter time’s 
construction as a resource available to (here, political) actors in their conduct. Time, produced thus, 
exists as something that must be (or is being) used maximally, and therefore productively, in the 
management of this crisis. No hour, no day will be lost by the government; no time will be wasted 
through political hesitancy. In the constructions of competence through claims to the unprece-
dented and timely nature of governmental activity, on the other hand, we encounter time instead as 
an external environment in which political action is located. Here, the response to COVID-19 is 
situated against or embedded within an exterior temporal framework; one that enables the 
identification of historical similarities and differences (in claims to uniqueness), while also structur-
ing the appropriateness of specific activities (in claims to timeliness).
Following Torre (2007), the first of these conceptions of time – as a resource – is important 
because it highlights political agency during this (narrated) crisis. It does so by depicting 
a government committed to, and competent in, the mastery of (all) available time. This depiction 
of an industrious, diligent executive, offered important discursive resources for responding to 
prominent criticisms of governmental inaction and hesitancy; criticisms that accompanied deci-
sions around, inter alia, the timing of national lockdowns, the closure of schools, and the delayed 
institution of an adequate test and trace system for monitoring the virus’ spread.2 In this sense, the 
metaphor has productivity for storying the government as a purposive, and likely gendered, actor 
efficiently consuming time to bring about progressive change in the UK’s current/future encounter 
with COVID-19. It also imbues the content of the UK’s response with a legitimacy derived from 
a determined, unceasing commitment to the shaping of that response.
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The second metaphor – of time as an environment – has a contrasting, more explicitly structural, 
emphasis when compared with the construction of time as a resource. Here, the focus is on 
unprecedented external events encumbering the government’s efforts at resolving this crisis, and 
the impressiveness of this response against such an unstable and unpredictable background. This 
metaphor once more helps construct the government as a rational political actor. It does so, though, 
through highlighting the congruence between circumstance and action, rather than foregrounding 
the maximally efficient use of (temporal) resources. It also serves to counter accusations of political 
error – rather than inaction – through its emphasis on the difficult exterior circumstances 
confronting the UK government. In the Prime Minister’s words, for example: ‘When this began, 
we hadn’t seen this disease before, and we didn’t fully understand its effects’ (Johnson 2020c). This 
construction, then, both differs from and complements that above by situating the response to 
COVID-19 within a politics of exceptionality in which a courageous, risk-taking executive is 
positioned as the appropriate and necessary antidote to this virus.
The importance of temporal claims in the articulation and legitimisation of the UK response to 
COVID-19 should, perhaps, come as little surprise. Politics – of security, and, indeed, anything 
else – is an inescapably temporal activity (Stevens 2016); as Debray (cited in Hay 1999, 319) neatly 
summarises: ‘time is to politics what space is to geometry’. The above constructions of credibility 
within official governmental discourse, therefore, far from exhaust the importance of temporality to 
this specific ‘crisis’ (see Jarvis 2020); a term, let us remember, with its own fundamentally temporal 
etymology (Hay 1999, 323). My argument in this brief intervention is simply that to understand the 
politics of COVID-19 we must engage with the politics of temporality, including the work that is 
done by temporal claims in producing, explaining, contextualising, and justifying political identities 
and actions. The above reflections, I hope, offer a starting point towards this.
Lee Jarvis is a Professor of International Politics at the University of East Anglia, UK. He is 
author or editor of fourteen books and over fifty articles or chapters on the politics of security.
Notes
1. The project concentrated on British governmental discourse on the COVID-19 coronavirus through to 
23 June 2020: the termination of the government’s daily press briefings. The corpus was collected directly 
from the official website of the Prime Minister’s office, hosted at www.gov.uk. Every text referencing the virus 
on the website was included for analysis, generating 121 different sources with an aggregated length of over 
77,000 words. Related, forthcoming, publications from this work focus on topics including the government’s 
use of numbers and mathematical language in this crisis; the positioning of the novel coronavirus within 
diverse temporal imaginaries; and constructions of legitimacy within the political response to COVID-19.
2. As the leader of the opposition, Keir Starmer, argued in December 2020: ‘We have a prime minister who is so 
scared of being unpopular that he is incapable of taking tough decisions until it is too late . . . It is this 
indecision and weak leadership that is costing lives and it is costing jobs’ (in Devlin 2020).
Acknowledgements
My sincere thanks to Aggie Hirst and Chris Rossdale for their helpful and perceptive feedback on an earlier draft of 
this article. My thanks, too, to Alan Finlayson, Michael Frazer, Tim Legrand, Michael Lister, and Andreas Musolff for 
their engagement with related outputs from this project which has inevitably contributed to my thinking here. Any 
errors remain my own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
74 L. JARVIS
Notes on contributor
Lee Jarvis is a Professor of International Politics at the University of East Anglia, UK. He is author or editor of 
fourteen books and over fifty articles or chapters on the politics of security, including Times of Terror: Discourse, 
Temporality and the War on Terror and Security: A Critical Introduction (with Jack Holland). Lee’s work has been 





Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J. De Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner.
Devlin, K. 2020. “Coronavirus: Boris Johnson’s Indecision Costing Lives, Keir Starmer Warns.” The Independent, 
December 20. Accessed 7 January 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-tier 
-4-labour-keir-starmer-b1776756.html 
Doty, R. L. 1993. “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy 
in the Philippines.” International Studies Quarterly 37 (3): 297–320. doi:10.2307/2600810.
Hay, C. 1999. “Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change.” The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1 (3): 317–344. doi:10.1111/1467-856X.00018.
Holland, J. 2013. “Foreign Policy and Political Possibility.” European Journal of International Relations 19 (1): 49–68. 
doi:10.1177/1354066111413310.
Jarvis, L. 2009. Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Jarvis, L. 2020. “Times of Crisis: Temporality and COVID-19.” Eastminster, April 27. accessed 11 January 2020. 
http://www.ueapolitics.org/2020/04/27/times-of-crisis-temporality-and-covid-1/ 
Johnson, B. 2020a. “Speech: PM Statement on Coronavirus.” March 17. Accessed 7 January 2020. https://www.gov. 
uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-17-march-2020 
Johnson, B. 2020b. “News Story: Prime Minister’s Statement on Coronavirus (COVID-19).” April 30. Accessed 7 January 
2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-30-april-2020 
Johnson, B. 2020c. “Speech: PM Address to the Nation on Coronavirus.” May 10. Accessed 11 January 2020. https:// 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-address-to-the-nation-on-coronavirus-10-may-2020 
Johnson, B. 2020d. “Authored Article: Prime Minister’s Article in the Mail on Sunday.” May 17. Accessed 7 January 
2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-article-in-the-mail-on-sunday-17-may-2020 
Number 10. 2020a. “Press Release: Prime Minister to Lead Cross-government Drive to Defeat Coronavirus.” March 
15. Accessed 7 January 2021. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-to-lead-cross-government- 
drive-to-defeat-coronavirus 
Number 10. 2020b. “News Story: New Government Structures to Coordinate Response to Coronavirus.” March 17. 
Accessed 7 January 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-government-structures-to-coordinate- 
response-to-coronavirus 
Raab, D. 2020a. “Speech: Foreign Secretary’s Statement on Coronavirus (COVID-19).” April 7. Accessed 11 January 
2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-7-april- 
2020 
Raab, D. 2020b. “Speech: Foreign Secretary’s Statement on Coronavirus (COVID-19).” April 9. Accessed 7 January 2020. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-9-april-2020 
Raab, D. 2020c. “Speech: Foreign Secretary’s Statement on Coronavirus (COVID-19).” May 7. Accessed 7 January 
2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-7-may- 
2020 
Ricoeur, P. 1990. Time and Narrative. Vol. 1. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Sharma, A. 2020a. “Speech: Business Secretary’s Statement on Coronavirus (COVID-19).” March 28. Accessed 7 
January 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/business-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid 
-19-28-march-2020 
Sharma, A. 2020b. “Speech: Business Secretary’s Statement on Coronavirus (COVID-19).” April 17. Accessed 7 
January 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/business-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid 
-19-17-april-2020 
Stevens, T. 2016. Cyber Security and the Politics of Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Torre, R. R. 2007. “Time’s Social Metaphors: An Empirical Research.” Time & Society 16 (2–3): 157–187. doi:10.1177/ 
0961463X07080262.
CRITICAL STUDIES ON SECURITY 75
